What does "zero knowledge" mean when an app says it?
Apps say the company cannot read your data because it never holds the key. Where the term comes from in cryptography, why it is loose, and what to ask instead.
A vault app, a password manager or a cloud drive may carry a banner. The banner says the company cannot read what you store, and it gives a cryptography term as the name. It reads like a promise of safety. It describes a design, and the details behind it decide whether it holds.
What do companies mean by it?
They mean the provider cannot read what you store. It runs servers and keeps your files there, but it does not have the key that opens them.
Bitwarden, a password manager, uses the term for its own design. Its blog post says the company cannot see a user's passwords or other vault items, and that only users retain the keys to their vaults. The key that encrypts the vault is derived from your master password. Data is encrypted the moment it enters a Bitwarden app, and Bitwarden never stores the master password. Its help page draws the consequence. Bitwarden has no way to access, retrieve or reset your master password.
Where does the term come from?
It comes from a different idea. In cryptography, a zero-knowledge protocol lets one party convince another that it knows secret information. A five-lectures tutorial by Jörg Rothe says it does so without disclosing any bit of that information. The same tutorial credits Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff with introducing the interactive proof systems that these protocols build on.
A protocol like that shows a fact about a secret and leaves the secret out. Keeping an encrypted file on a server is the older idea, encryption with a key that stays with you. Apps use the same name for that second idea.
What can the phrase leave open?
The phrase does not say what counts as your data. Bitwarden's post says the company encrypts the names of items and folders as well as their contents. Another app may encrypt the contents and leave file names, sizes or dates readable by its server. The app's page should say which.
The phrase does not say what happens when you forget the password. Bitwarden's help page names a master password hint and an emergency contact. In organizations that use account recovery, it also names an administrator who can reset the master password. An emergency contact and an administrator reset are second ways in, set up ahead of time. The page also says that if none of its routes applies, there is no way for Bitwarden to recover the account or its data.
What should you ask instead?
Start with where the keys are made. If your phone or computer makes them and the company never receives a copy, the company cannot hand them over or lose them. If the server makes them, the claim rests on trust.
Next, find out what a reset does. A "forgot password" email that restores your files means something besides your password can open them. A reset that wipes the vault is a different design, and a harsher one. Each has a cost, and the app should say which one it chose.
Then look at what the server can see. Look for the number of files, their sizes, the dates they changed and any names. A server that stores your files sees at least that they exist.
Last, see whether anyone can test it. A sentence on a web page is a promise. A written format, published code or an outside review lets someone else test it.
An app that answers these in plain words has told you more than the label can. The article on how to judge a vault app covers the rest of the checklist.
TegoSafe's answers to the four questions
TegoSafe gives plain answers in place of a label.
- Where the keys are made. Your iPhone makes them. There is no account and no TegoSafe server to send a copy to.
- What a reset does. There is no reset email. The printed recovery card reopens Documents on this phone.
- What the server can see. TegoSafe has no server. With backup on, only encrypted files go to your own iCloud, and Apple cannot read what is in them.
- Whether anyone can test it. The vault format is written down as a spec, so others can check it.
The scan and your first 25 documents are free. See how it is protected.
Is the claim on an app page the same as a cryptographic proof?
No. The proof is a defined protocol. The claim on an app page describes who holds the keys, and the page alone cannot show it.
Does the claim mean nobody else can open my data?
No. It says the company cannot. You can, with your password or recovery code, and so can anyone who gets those or who holds your unlocked phone.
We make TegoSafe, an iPhone app for locking documents. This guide works without it.